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Abstract—Recently, several cross-layer protocols have been
designed for vehicular networks to optimize data dissemination
by ensuring internal communications between routing and MAC
layers. In this context, a cross-layer protocol, called TDMA-
aware Routing Protocol for Multi-hop communications (TRPM),
was proposed in order to efficiently select a relay node based
on time slot scheduling information obtained from the MAC
layer. However, due to the constant evolution of cyber-attacks
on the routing and MAC layers, data dissemination in vehicular
networks is vulnerable to several types of attack. In this paper,
we identify the different attack models that can disrupt the cross-
layer operation of the TRPM protocol and assess their impact
on performance through simulation. Several new vulnerabilities
related to the MAC slot scheduling process are identified.
Exploiting of these vulnerabilities would lead to severe channel
capacity wastage where up to half of the free slots could not be
reserved.
Index Terms—VANET, Security, Cross-layer routing, Black-
hole attack, Gray-hole attack, MAC attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Given the increasingly high accident rate on the roads, one
of the major aims of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)
project which is to improve road safety. In this perspective
Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) have been proposed
to allow vehicles to communicate and exchange information
describing road conditions in order to minimize accidents and
improve the driving quality. VANET were officially launched
with the IEEE 802.11p [1] standard, which gave rise to a
new communication paradigm allowing vehicles to exchange
different types of information, notably messages for signaling
accidents or congestion on the road. VANETs also offer the
possibility of providing so-called infotainment services to im-
prove passenger comfort. In summary, VANETs applications
can broadly be divided into three categories: safety services,
traffic management and user-oriented services [2].
Taking into consideration the specific characteristics of
VANETs, particularly the high mobility of vehicles that leads
to rapid changes in the network topology, any routing protocol
must react quickly to convey information, especially safety
messages. Hence, since the launch of VANETs, several works
on data routing have been conducted in order to optimize the
packets dissemination in terms of end-to-end delay and packet
delivery ratio. Some of these proposals [8], [9] are based on
geographic position like GPSR, some are based on topology
like AODV. But they are all linked only to the network
layer without considering parameters of other layers. This
traditional architecture cannot often support the specific needs
of a vehicular network, essentially the very dynamic change
in topology, but above all it does not guarantee QoS since the
IEEE 802.11p standard is a contention-based MAC method,
hence it cannot ensure an efficient broadcast with bounded
access delays. The cross-layer concept represents a promising
solution to overcome the limits of a classical routing based on
a single layer and to ensure a better selection of the forwarding
candidate. The TRPM protocol [3], [6] was designed as a
cross-layer approach based on data exchange between routing
and MAC layers. The slot scheduling is based on a completely
distributed TDMA scheduling scheme called DTMAC [4],
which requires confirmation of the reservation from all the
neighbors, otherwise the reservation will be considered to have
failed. The choice of an efficient relay node in the routing
process is based on distance information and the waiting time
calculated through the DTMAC scheduling.
However, with the remarkable increase in security threats,
securing the data dissemination process against attacks is
therefore primordial, since fake messages from attackers may
cause a disruption in the road and therefore can directly
affect people’s life. Thus, studying the impact of attacks
on data routing is extremely necessary, before forming a
security solution, to find out how much it can be affected.
Moreover, several works have been carried out in this context,
for instance, in [5] Jose Grimaldo et al studied the impact of
the black hole attack on the performance of the AODV, OLSR,
DSR, and DSDV protocols in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio
(PDR), Network load overhead and End to End Delay (EED)
using a Panama City realistic urban scenario. In [7], Abdulaziz
Alshammari et al presented a performance study of the AODV
protocol in the presence of malicious nodes using a real time
vehicular traffic simulation in the Greater Detroit area. The
results showed a remarkable decrease in the performance in
terms of throughput, PDR and EED.
In this direction, this paper is going to outline the potential
threats, that could affect the TRPM protocol. New vulnerabil-
ities, that do not exist in the literature, have been identified in
this work. These vulnerabilities result from the use of TDMA
slot scheduling information in the TRPM forwarding decision
and target the availability by disrupting the slot reservation
process. Furthermore, many attacks threaten the data routing
process of the TRPM protocol, the most important of them
is the black-hole attack, in which a malicious node could
delay, modify or drop all packets supposed to be forwarded.
In a second step of this work, we assess the impact of those
attacks on the TRPM protocol in terms of packet delivery ratio,
end-to-end delay and channel usage ratio. The remainder of
this paper is structured as follows: Section II summarizes the
principle of the TRPM routing protocol. Section III describes
security vulnerabilities that can affect data dissemination using
TRPM protocol. In Section IV, we present the simulation re-
sults and the performance impact analysis. Finally, conclusion
and future work are reported in Section V.
II. TDMA-AWARE ROUTING PROTOCOL FOR MULTI-HOP
COMMUNICATIONS IN VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
(TRPM)
In this section, we briefly describe the cross-layer TRPM
protocol. The forwarding decisions in TRPM are based on
nodes positions and slot scheduling information coming from
the MAC layer, which operates under the DTMAC protocol.
In the following, we firstly present the MAC layer protocol:
DTMAC. Then we describe the TRPM forwarding algorithm
principle.
A. Distributed TDMA-based MAC (DTMAC) Protocol
In [4], Mohamed et al. proposed a distributed and location-
based TDMA-based MAC protocol called DTMAC in order
to avoid collisions, caused by the hidden node problem and to
provide a reliable broadcast service with bounded access delay
using the vehicle location and slot reuse concept. DTMAC is
based on the hypothesis that the road is divided into small
areas of length equal to R, where R is the communication
range. The time is partitioned into frames, each frame being
partitioned into three equal sets of time slots S0, S1 and S2.
Each frame contains a fixed number of slots equal to T and
each time slot has a fixed time duration. For collision-free
scheduling, each packet transmitted by any vehicle must con-
tain an additional information item called Frame Information
(FI). As shown in Figure 1, the FI consists of a set of ID
Fields (IDFs) of size equal to the number of time slots per
frame. Each IDF is mainly composed of three fields describing
the state of each slot time, free or occupied, through the
SLT − STS field. It also allows to provide the address of
the vehicle that uses the slot through the V C − ID field and
the type of packet transmitted through the PKT −TY P field.
At the end of the frame, any vehicle can determine the sets
of busy and free slots. If vehicle x wishes to reserve a time
slot, it must listen to the channel during the set Sj of time
Fig. 1. Frame Information (FI) structure.
slots reserved for the area i in which it is traveling where
j = (i + 2) mod 3. After identifying the free time slots,
vehicle x randomly selects one of the free slots (say slot k) and
updates its Frame Information locally. Thereafter, x broadcasts
during slot k its FI to all its neighbors. It considers that its
reservation has been successful if all the neighbors report in
their FI that slot k is used by vehicle x.
B. TRPM Packet Forwarding Algorithm
TRPM routing protocol [3] is based on a cross layer
architecture which relies on close communication with the
MAC layer to improve transfer decisions. Thus, the forwarding
relay selection algorithm takes into account on the destination
vehicle’s position and the slot scheduling information obtained
from the MAC layer, using the DTMAC protocol.
In fact, each data transmitter uses the slot scheduling infor-
mation to determine the optimal set of next hops, situated
in the next or previous adjacent areas, closest geographically
to the destination by observing, respectively, the set of time
slots S(i+2) % 3 or S(i+1) % 3 where i represents the area of
the transmitting vehicle. More precisely, when a packet is
received, the vehicle looks among its neighbors for a relay
node that optimizes the value of a normalized weight function
WHS calculated as follows:




• T represents the number of slots per frame.
• j is one of the neighbor candidates to be the next relay.
• ∆ti,j represents the difference between the emission slot
of vehicle i and that of vehicle j.
• di,j represents the distance between the source and the
destination vehicle.
• R represents the communication range.
By extracting the area ID of the transmitter vehicle contained
in the received message, vehicle j can determine the appropri-
ate set of potential relays. Then it will use the weight function
WHS to select a forwarding vehicle in the next area. Finally,
the node with the minimum WHS value will be selected as
the best relay node.
III. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
Data routing is the key mechanism for any type of network.
Indeed, it is thanks to the means of selecting the best next
hops provided by the routing protocols that data dissemination
is improved. However, in a less centralized vehicular envi-
ronment, vehicles move freely in a fully distributed network,
and the lack of centralized control and defense mechanisms
make it vulnerable to multiple routing attacks. In this context,
an absence of adequate security measures, can degrade the
network performance in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR),
End-to-End Delay (EED), availability, etc.
Furthermore, since packet dissemination is a key service to
guarantee the proper functioning of the network, this makes it
an ideal target for attackers. Attackers could disable or inter-
cept the path between the source and the destination, or even
completely cut it, where information could be manipulated,
modified or even lost. In this case, the effect of VANET is
reversed, and it becomes a danger to passenger safety and
may cause accidents.
Whatever the performances provided, any routing algorithm
remains very vulnerable to security attacks. This is particularly
the case when malicious nodes are present since there is a
high probability that the intermediate nodes launch attacks
either passive, by intercepting the transmitted data, or actively,
by confusing the network with concrete attacks, like the
removing, the modification or the late arrival of packets. This
represents a serious problem which must be taken into account
to improve the quality of services provided and mostly to
ensure the availability of the network. In this context, we
will study, in this section, the various threats that can target
the security of the TRPM protocol. These attacks are mainly
classified into two levels: (i) Network level attacks and (ii)
MAC layer attacks.
A. Network Layer Attacks
Unlike traditional networks, VANET is an open environment
with no fixed infrastructure, which makes network security
very difficult to achieve. Some serious security vulnerabilities
related to the network layer are briefly described in this
section.
1) Black-Hole Attack: This attack is one of the most
common types of attacks in ad hoc networks, it is an active
internal attack on availability. In this attack, the malicious
node presents itself as an authentic relay point that can deliver
the packet correctly. As shown in Figure 2, once it receives
packets, the node that is supposed to relay the packets, rejects
them and thus opens the way to a denial of service attack.
As a result, the impact of a black-hole attack is very severe,
especially that the nature of this attack makes it difficult to
detect or to prevent.
2) Gray-Hole Attack: This is a category of a black-hole
attack in that the malicious node deletes packets but, in this
case, this is done in a partial or a selective way. In fact,
the malicious node can switch between two modes: either it
remains in normal mode as a harmless node or it switches to
the attack mode. Here, as shown in Figure 3, attackers rely
Fig. 2. Black-hole attack principle.
on a selective packet dropping method that determines how
they operate during the forwarding process, for example by
eliminating all packets to a particular destination, a partial
dropping based on random selection method, at every time
period or after a certain number of packets. Gray-hole attack
detection are harder to detect than black-hole attacks, since
due to the selective transfer, some traffic still flows across the
network.
Fig. 3. Gray-hole attack principle.
3) Packet Transfer Delay: Central to VANET networks
is their ability to report road problems, attackers will, of
course, seek to undermine this function by launching timing
attacks in which a malicious node delays the forwarding of a
packet by adding an additional duration to render the message
useless. VANET security applications are critical and very
time-sensitive, in fact, a delay of just a few seconds can have
extremely serious consequences, thus it is very important to
detect and prevent these types of attack.
B. Medium Access Control (MAC) Layer Attacks
In this paper, we identify several new vulnerabilities that
result from the use of the DTMAC slot scheduling information
to make next hop selection decision in TRPM. The details of
each identified attack are described in this section.
1) Channel Access Deny Attack: As we already detailed
in Section II, during the reservation process (see Figure 4),
when a vehicle wants to acquire a slot time, it must wait
for confirmation from all its neighbors to be able to say
that its request has been successful. In other words, all its
neighbors must indicate in their FIs that the slot is being used
by this vehicle. Here, the attacker could intervene to prevent
the process by indicating in its FI that the slot is not reserved
by this vehicle. The purpose of the attacker here is to disrupt
the slot reservation process and to block access. This security
breach could lead to serious problems such as a denial of
service by preventing vehicles from acquiring time slots even
to send security messages.
2) Slot Reservation Attack: by using the scheduling algo-
rithm linked to DTMAC, only one slot per frame is authorized
to be reserved by the same vehicle. However it is possible that
a selfish vehicle requests several slots during the same frame.
Fig. 4. Example of denial of access attack
3) Frame Information Poisoning: Frame Information is
exchanged in clear with no guarantee of the integrity of
its content. Thus, it is very easy therefore to falsify it. For
example, a malicious node can falsify the state of a free slot
through indicating it as occupied to prevent vehicles from
acquiring it
4) Malicious MAC Behavior: this attack is a form of
selfishness and anarchism in which a vehicle seizes another
slot, different to its reserved one, to send its data.
5) Identity Spoofing: during this attack, a malicious vehicle
creates several fake identities and then uses them in the
Frame Information in order to achieve malicious objectives.
An example could be, the use of several false identities to
acquire several time slots during the same frame. Subsequently
with these several identities, this attacker can create illusions
of events that don’t really exist.
To study the security level of the TRPM routing protocol,
we injected the previously detailed attacks and analyse their
impact. The simulation results are detailed in Section IV.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF IMPACT
PERFORMANCE
A. Simulation Setup
In order to evaluate the impact of the different attacks
detailed in the previous section, we developed several attack
models by injecting malicious behavior for a varying number
of vehicles in the network. Three attacks are evaluated in this
study:
i Black-hole attack in which malicious nodes remove or
delay each packet received,
ii Gray-hole attack in which the removal or the delaying
of packets is linked to a random selection function.
iii MAC level attack in which we simulate denial of access
attacks.
We simulated these attacks models using the NS2 simulator.
Moreover, we have used the same traffic scenarios used in
[10] generated with SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility)
[11]. In all the scenarios, multi-hop unicast data packets are
periodically sent from a source vehicle to a single destination
through several relay nodes. The simulation parameters used in
these simulations are summarized in Table I. For each attack,









Vehicles Density 43, 128, 256
Ratio of malicious nodes 1%, 10% ..., 30% of nodes
only 43 vehicles are moving in the highway, (ii) medium
density with 128 vehicles and (iii) high density scenario with
256 vehicles in the network. To evaluate the performance of
the TRPM protocol under the attack scenarios, we used the
following metrics: The Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), End-to-
End Delay (EED) and the Average number of reserved slots.
The evaluation metrics are defined as follows:
• Packet Delivery Ratio is defined as the ratio of total
number of packets received to the total number of packets
sent from the source vehicle to the destination during the
simulation.
• End-to-End delay defined as the average time required
to deliver all the packets sent from the source to the
destination vehicle.
• Average number of reserved slots is computed as the
average slots occupied per frame during the total number
of frames.
B. Black-Hole Attack Impact Analysis
In the simulations we compared the performance of the
TRPM protocol with and without Black-hole attack in the low,
medium and high density scenarios. We computed its PDR
and EED by evaluating the effect of increasing the ratio of
malicious vehicles.
We, firstly, evaluate the impact of the attack in terms of PDR.
As shown in Figure 5, TRPM in its normal state, i.e. without
attacks, provides a very strong capacity for delivering packets
that is always close to the ideal rate, i.e. 100%. Whether
in the low, the medium or the high density network, TRPM
without attacks achieves an average PDR of 95%. However,
this capacity is very sensitive to Black-hole attacks, and a
very remarkable decrease in the rate of delivered packets is
observed especially when the number of black-hole attackers
nodes in the network increases. For instance, in the low density
scenario, when 30% of nodes work as attackers, only 13%
of the data packets are successfully delivered. Moreover, we
observe that the impact of the Black-hole attack on the PDR
increases when the vehicle density decreases. For example,
when 30% of the nodes are malicious, the Black-hole attack
decreases the PDR in the high density case to about 36%,
whereas in the the low density case, the PDR falls to 13%.
This can be explained by the fact that the number of relay
nodes in a dense network is lower than that in a low density
network, since TRPM chooses the farthest node as a forwarder.
Hence, the probability to have an attacker in the path between
the source and the destination is higher when the number of
forwarders increases, i.e. in the low density scenario. We also
Fig. 5. Black-hole attack : The average Packet Delivery Ratio vs number of
Black-hole attacker nodes
evaluate the impact of Black-hole attack on TRPM’s EED,
which is really one of the serious constraints for security
applications in VANETs as they are sensitive to delay. In this
scenario, Black-hole attacker nodes delay each received packet
before relaying it to introduce an ”artificial” forwarding delay.
The results plotted in Figure 6 clearly illustrate the effect of the
packet transfer delay attack on the EED. For instance, in the
low density scenario and when 30% of the vehicles perform
Black-hole attack by delaying packet forwarding, the resulting
EED is 25 times greater than when TRPM is used without
attack. In fact, the presence of Black-hole attackers on the
highway increases the EED up to 1.8s. This value represents
a very long delay that is never suitable for several VANET
security applications where the EED must not exceed a strict
threshold. In fact, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of
alert messages, for example in the case of a wrong way driver
warning or an approaching emergency vehicle warning, the
EED must not surpass a maximum of 1s, according to [12].
Even, in the presence of a low ratio of attackers, namely 1%,
the EED, in a high density network, increases from 55, 57ms
to 250, 78ms. Hence, even with only one malicious vehicle in
the network, the EED is about 5 times greater, which clearly
indicates the extent to which this protocol can be affected by
such attacks.
C. Gray-Hole Attack Impact Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of TRPM under
Gray-hole attack. In the same way as before, we evaluated
its PDR and EED while increasing the ratio of malicious
vehicles and varying the network density. Similarly to the
Black-hole attack, as shown in Figure 7, the PDR of TRPM de-
creases in the presence of Gray-hole attackers but less sharply
than Black-hole effect, due to the random selective transfer
method.For instance, in the case of low density with 30%
malicious nodes, the PDR does not exceed 47%, which means
that more than half of the packets are lost due to the attack.
The same for the medium density case with 30% of attackers
Fig. 6. Black-hole attack: Average End-to-End Delay vs number of Black-
hole attacker nodes
nodes, we notice a decrease in the packet delivery rate for
around 43% compared to the case without attack and less
pointedly in the case of high density, where it drops to 52%.
To study the EED metric, we simulated several scenarios that
Fig. 7. Gray-hole attack: The average Packet Delivery Ratio vs number of
Gray-hole attacker nodes
involve packet forwarding delay during a random period under
the Gray-hole attack. Results plotted in Figure 8, confirm that
the EED experiences irregular growth but slightly lower than
the case of Black-hole attack. It is worth mentioning that, in a
medium density network, with 20% of nodes as attackers, the
EED is around 12 times greater than in the case of the TRPM
without attack. These observations also show the negative
impact that these attacks can have on the EED which, we
recall, must not exceed a certain scale in order to guarantee
timely safety packets delivery. Therefore, it is essential to
enhance the TRPM protocol by introducing robust detection
and prevention techniques to secure data routing against these
types of attack.
D. Channel Access Deny Attack Impact Analysis
In this subsection, we evaluate the impact of the MAC level
attacks, that we identified in Section III.B, on the performance
of the TRPM protocol. More precisely, we simulated denial
of access attack in which a malicious vehicle firstly launches
a Frame Information poisoning attack by falsifying its FI and
then it will broadcast it to its neighbor which results in an
Fig. 8. Gray-hole attack: Average End-to-End Delay vs number of gray-hole
attacker nodes
access attack by preventing the reservation. To further show the
effect of this attack, we launched it during 30 frames in which
a malicious vehicle tries to disrupt the reservation process of
about 20% of the vehicles in the network. The results are
evaluated according to the average number of slots occupied
per frame during the total number of frames. At first glance
and based on Figure 9, we can directly observe that the number
of reserved slots clearly declines. For instance, in the case of
low density, the access attack results in the wastage of 47%
of the slots during frame number 30, which means that almost
half of the slots that should be used can not be reserved, even
though they are free, and therefore about half of the overall
channel capacity is wasted due to this MAC attack. From there,
we can clearly deduce the gravity of this attack and its impact
on the slot scheduling mechanism.
Fig. 9. MAC level Attack: Channel access rate vs frame number.
V. CONCLUSION
The highly dynamic nature of vehicular networks not only
makes their configuration and set up difficult, but also makes
them very vulnerable to attack, especially with the absence
of a central control. Therefore, in order to make VANETs
more secure, it is essential to study and assess the impact
that attacks can have on data dissemination in these networks.
In this paper we have identified the most serious attack
models and have used simulation to assess their impact on
the TRPM cross-layer protocol. We have identified several
previously undocumented vulnerabilities which threaten the
time slots scheduling process of TRPM. In addition, we have
demonstrated through different attack models, the extent of the
damage that these vulnerabilities can lead on the performance
of the TRPM protocol. The simulation results show the sever-
ity of these attacks, on the performance of TRPM in terms
of Packet Delivery Ratio, which drastically decreases to 13%
under the effect of Black-hole attack. The End-to-End Delay
evaluation reveals the presence of Black-hole and Gray-hole
attackers in the network increases the transmission delay up
to 1.8s which exceeds the acceptable threshold for a number
of delay-sensitive VANET applications. Finally, exploiting the
slot scheduling vulnerability that we identified reveals that up
to 47% of free slots could not be reserved due to MAC attack
which means that 1/2 of channel capacity is wasted.
In future work, we will exploit the results of this investigation,
to develop a solution for detecting and preventing attacks
threatening the TRPM protocol. Mainly we will focus on the
new identified MAC level attacks to provide a solution against
these types of malicious behavior.
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